The most striking aspect of President Lee Jae-myung's diplomacy is the expansion of the Freedom Edge exercise. Conducted for five days in September 2025—longer than the three days under the Yoon Suk-yeol administration—the exercise has drawn criticism from those who argue that South Korea continues to be drawn into the strategic agendas of great powers under the banner of pragmatic diplomacy. This perspective emphasises historical responsibility, particularly unresolved issues in Korea–Japan relations, and reflects broader concerns that security cooperation may come at the expense of diplomatic autonomy.
Such criticisms are not limited to the immediate question of military exercises but are rooted in a longer historical understanding of East Asia as a region shaped by unresolved wars and divided postwar orders. The First East Asian War, Japan's war of aggression backed by the Anglo-American powers, was not properly settled after Korea's liberation and therefore became prolonged. The Second East Asian War was the establishment of an anti-communist divided regime south of the 38th parallel to protect Japan. What is needed is the independence of both Korea and Japan, the securing of an autonomous zone free from the influence of both the United States and China, and a balance of power.
These criticisms deserve serious consideration. However, they do not fully account for the structural pressures confronting South Korea in the current international environment. To understand the limits and possibilities of Korea's diplomatic autonomy, it is necessary to situate these historical concerns within the constraints imposed by contemporary political and economic structures. For South Korea, strengthening cooperation with the United States is not merely a matter of alliance loyalty but a strategic response to shifting conditions in the global political economy. President Lee's emphasis on changes in the “real economy” as a core task of state administration reflects an intention to translate growth into tangible improvements in people's lives. Yet discussion of the real economy cannot be separated from the evolving nature—and limitations—of U.S. hegemony and the strategic space available to middle powers such as South Korea.
In the intensifying competition for AI leadership between the United States and China, the two powers are pursuing distinct strategies. The United States prioritises the maintenance of global influence through control over standards, supply chains, and critical infrastructure, while China seeks to embed AI technologies directly into manufacturing and industrial systems to consolidate its position in the real economy. These divergent approaches highlight not only rivalry between great powers but also the constraints imposed on countries positioned between them.
South Korea's response, therefore, cannot be reduced to simple alignment. With comparative advantages in manufacturing, advanced packaging of AI semiconductors, and the production capacity for high-performance computing equipment, Korea possesses the potential to build a more autonomous industrial foundation. Doing so requires careful analysis of China's technology-driven industrial integration alongside the U.S. emphasis on infrastructure, security, and alliance-based coordination.
This strategic challenge cannot be considered in isolation from Japan, whose technological and industrial trajectory is deeply intertwined with Korea's position in the regional economy. Japan also shows a strong tendency to depend on foreign countries in the field of AI technology, so it is important to make use of short-term cooperation with the United States while ultimately building an independent industrial foundation. In this context, a strategy of constructing an autonomous domain separated from both the United States and China through cooperation with Korea can also be considered.
From this perspective, closer military cooperation with the United States should be understood as a strategic choice among several, shaped by the need to secure technological infrastructure and maintain access to critical networks. None of the foregoing arguments suggest that Japan's wartime responsibility should be set aside or ignored. Addressing Japan's wartime responsibility should not be viewed as an emotional or disruptive act that undermines trilateral cooperation. Rather, it is a necessary effort to manage a structural source of instability within the U.S.–ROK–Japan framework. Ignoring unresolved historical issues may temporarily ease coordination, but it ultimately weakens the moral and political foundations of long-term cooperation. The challenge for the Lee administration lies in ensuring that trilateral cooperation supports, rather than constrains, South Korea's long-term industrial strategy and diplomatic autonomy.
Seohyun Kim is a columnist at Asia-Pacific Democracy Incubator. She is an undergraduate student studying diplomacy at Ewha Womans University and currently serves as President of EITA (Ewha International Trade Association), with research interests in South Korea's strategic role in East Asian geopolitics.