When President Donald Trump announced his "Liberation Day" tariffs, a set of sweeping import duties on foreign goods created in hopes to offset America's "huge" trade deficit; the move was framed as a bold economic statecraft. What bought its recognition was that these reciprocal tariffs were unlike anything in the history of the U.S.. In the past, tariffs had typically targeted specific products or countries, President Trump's new plan tied baseline rates directly to bilateral trade balances, with higher tariffs imposed on nations exporting more to the U.S. than they imported. His message was clear: trade deficits were now threats to be countered with heavy penalties, now wonderfully packaged in the form of "dubiously legal" tariffs.
Tariffs are largely the responsibility of the congress, in certain conditions, the congress may delegate power to the President. Although the "Liberation Day" tariffs has not been consented by congress, the administration leaned on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) of 1977, along with older trade statutes like Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 and Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, to justify this overreach of power. But while the aforementioned sections were designed for trade disputes, IEEPA was a wartime measure enacted during the Cold War to give presidents latitude to sanction foreign adversaries in national emergencies. The central question is whether a trade deficit amounts to the kind of "unusual and extraordinary threat" that IEEPA was meant to cover. Historically, presidents have used IEEPA to freeze assets or impose sanctions on hostile governments. It has never been the foundation for a wholesale redesign of tariff policy. The invokement of IEEPA for trade deficits stretches the statute far beyond its intent and hands the executive branch unprecedented power over an area traditionally reserved for the Congress.
The courts have already pushed back. In May 2025, the Court of International Trade ruled that many IEEPA-based tariffs exceeded presidential authority, finding no statutory basis for such widespread import restrictions. Months later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit went further, declaring in a 7–4 decision that IEEPA simply does not authorize tariffs at all. Tariff power, the court emphasized, is rooted in Congress's constitutional authority over taxation and trade and no reading of IEEPA transfers that power to the executive. The administration has appealed, and the Supreme Court will hear arguments on November 5, 2025. The justices must decide whether IEEPA can be stretched into a trade tool or whether President Trump's tariffs represent executive overreach incompatible with the separation of powers.
Legality aside, do they work? Treasury data shows that customs duties and certain excise taxes generated $152 billion through July, which is about twice as much as the $78 billion netted during the same period last fiscal year. However, whether they are a net positive is yet to be determined as some negative effects such as the stifling of growth are only tangible in the long run. This may be largely unimportant as President Trump seems to have an ulterior motive for these tariffs, framing them as leverage in negotiations, hoping that foreign governments, facing American penalties in turn, will be more willing to offer concessions.
Negotiations
The Supreme Court's upcoming ruling could reshape presidential power in trade for decades to come. If the Court upholds the lower rulings, President Trump's tariffs will be invalidated, and the executive branch will face clear limits in using IEEPA as a trade weapon. This would reaffirm Congress's constitutional role and prevent future presidents from unilaterally declaring economic "emergencies". If the Court instead overturns those rulings, the presidency will gain broad new latitude to unilaterally impose tariffs under emergency powers. This precedent would extend far beyond President Trump, effectively transforming IEEPA into a general-purpose trade tool available to any president. Even if one accepts tariffs as a blunt negotiating tactic, building them on the shaky foundation of IEEPA is unsustainable. Using a wartime emergency statute to regulate peacetime trade undermines the separation of powers and risks destabilizing U.S. economic policy. President Trump might say that we are under attack from immigrants and that other countries are taking advantage of the U.S., but it seems like a far stretch to call them war-time national emergencies. To pretend otherwise is to erode both the credibility of American law and the legitimacy of presidential authority. It is my belief that Congress should reassert its role in trade policy by clarifying the boundaries of statutes like IEEPA. Negotiation requires leverage, but it also requires credibility. Tariffs imposed on legal quicksand provide neither.
Katie Yook is an economics student at Keio University and a writer passionate about connecting data with lived experience. Her work explores how law, culture, and communication shape the world economy. She believes opinion writing is not just about taking a stance, but about opening space for conversation and curiosity. She hopes to further her research on interdisciplinary issues bridging economics, policy, and society, and to continue writing pieces that translate complex ideas into accessible public dialogue.